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Communitizing Transnational Regulatory Concerns 
Sungjoon Cho, Jacob Radecki, and Cecilia Suh 
Abstract 
 
The conventional, rationalist view explains that a state will only assent to international 
regulation if such regulation directly serves the state’s interest. In contrast, nascent transnational 
regulatory intermediaries, such as the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) Committee, seek to ameliorate such parochial state interests through a broader 
interstate dialogue. This Article addresses the challenging question of whether these intermediaries 
have any meaningful effect on the resolution of interstate trade disputes. To examine this question, 
this Article utilizes data from over 400 examples of “specific trade concerns” (STCs) raised by 
WTO members in the TBT Committee. Our statistical analysis demonstrates that 
confrontational (legal) inquiries, as opposed to inquiries seeking clarification, regarding members’ 
technical regulations tend to reduce the likelihood of the resolution of underlying disputes. Our 
findings suggest that the way regulatory problems are discussed, and thus communitized, affects 
the way that parties ultimately reconcile. This Article closes with a call for more qualitative 
research methods, such as interviewing TBT Committee participants, to further explore the 
complexities inherent in the new communitized transnational regulatory environment. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
In this Article we argue that the conventional command-and-control 
theories related to regulatory requirements fall away in the face of transnational 
regulatory governance. We therefore seek a new explanatory model that prioritizes 
and recognizes the discursive nature of international regulatory proceedings. 
Importantly, we contend that the way regulatory problems are discussed, and thus 
the way they are communitized, affects the way parties ultimately reconcile 
regulatory disputes. We conclude that collaborative and less confrontational 
regulatory exchanges tend to be significantly more successful than formal and 
inquisitive ones. 
Globalization has added a transnational layer of complication to the 
conventional regulatory dyad of regulator (rule-maker) and regulatee (rule-taker). 
Suppose that the Australian government regulates the proper labeling and 
packaging of tobacco products. It requires all cigarettes marketed in Australia to 
be packaged in a plain, standardized form without any branding, such as logos and 
images; however, the package must include a serious health warning.1 Also 
suppose that Ukrainian cigarette exporters refuse to comply with the labeling 
(packaging) requirement on the grounds that such a draconian rule is an 
unnecessary trade restriction and therefore violates the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Here, 
two regulatory relationships interface with each other. First, Ukrainian cigarette 
exporters, the rule-takers, are supposed to abide by the tobacco labeling 
requirement enacted by Australia, the rule-maker. Second, Australia, as rule-taker, 
must comply with WTO norms, such as the TBT Agreement, a rule-maker. 
Ukraine, on behalf of its cigarette exporters, may question Australia’s tobacco 
labeling regulation by invoking Australia’s obligations under the TBT.2 
Thus, the conventional view of the regulatory process as a two-way game 
envisions two separate governance structures—domestic and international. 
Typically, both states and private businesses qua rule-takers will comply with rules 
if, and only if, behaving (compliance) is in their interest, or if violating (non-
compliance) would entail certain disutilities, such as a penalty.3 Applying the 
conventional model to the aforementioned hypothesis, Ukraine cigarette 
                                                 
1  Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Act No. 148, 2011) (Austl.).  
2  See Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, Request for Consultation, DS434 (Mar. 13, 2012). 
3  Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 585–87 (2004); Kenneth W. 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 424–26 
(2000); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of 
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345, 350–56 (1997); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based 
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1860–61 (2002). Regarding the critique on the 
conventional (rationalist) approach to compliance, see generally SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE: NORMS, COMMUNITY AND CONSTITUTION, 120–63 (2015). 
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exporters would likely elect to defy the Australian labeling requirement if 
compliance is too costly to them and their business partners, such as Philip Morris, 
who built cigarette factories in Ukraine. Likewise, in the event that the WTO 
invalidates Australia’s labeling requirement, Australia would likely agree to repeal 
the measure if a potential sanction is too painful to bear. 
While the conventional view offers a simple yet powerful heuristic on 
regulatory governance, that view fails to embrace more nuanced aspects of 
regulatory relationships. The conventional preoccupation with law as coercion 
(enforcement) tends to dismiss important non-material dimensions of WTO 
norms, such as their rhetorical power. In other words, the two-way game 
regulatory model does not capture various discursive pathways provided by a 
regulatory intermediary. A regulatory intermediary, such as the TBT Committee, 
connects the domestic and international regulatory spheres and helps build a 
“compliance community” by hosting regulatory dialogue in a transnational 
setting.4  
The ultimate rationale of the TBT Agreement is to achieve ostensibly 
conflicting goals of free trade and regulatory autonomy in a non-entropic, 
harmonious manner.5 A number of “procedural” disciplines under the TBT 
Agreement, such as transparency, notification, and reason giving, are geared 
toward these dual goals.6 These procedural disciplines are meta-regulation in that 
they regulate how each WTO member regulates in the domestic sphere. In this 
regard, the TBT Committee, in particular through specific trade concerns (STCs), 
provides a communal forum in which WTO members conduct peer review on 
other members’ domestic regulations in accordance with these procedural 
disciplines.7 The operational logic of the TBT Committee is not so much coercion 
as it is discourse by design. In other words, the TBT Committee provides both 
exporting countries that usually share the goal of free trade and importing 
                                                 
4  Regarding the “compliance community,” see generally, KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S 
POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS (2009); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Laurence R. Helfer & Eric Voeten, 
International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77 
(2014). 
5  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, pmbl. [hereinafter TBT 
Agreement]; see also Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic 
Dilemma, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005). 
6  See SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 120–63; 
Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 675 (2009); Sungjoon Cho, From 
Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 249 (2011) 
[hereinafter Cho, From Control to Communication]. 
7  See Sungjoon Cho, How the World Trade Community Operates: Norms and Discourse, 13 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 685, 700 (2014) (observing that the institutionalization of peer review under the TBT 
Agreement requires WTO members to defend the legality of their regulatory positions if challenged) 
[hereinafter Cho, Norms and Discourse]. 
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countries that often represent the value of regulatory autonomy with unique 
discursive opportunities to engage in learning, perspective taking, mutual 
persuasion, and eventually the development of non-binary regulatory solutions.8 
The logic of discourse can be warranted particularly by the indeterminate nature 
of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which restrict the flow of goods and services 
through means other than tariffs, and the inevitable governance gap they create. 
The reciprocal bargaining model prevalent in conventional trade negotiation 
simply does not work in tackling these NTBs, which are fraught with 
irreconcilable socio-cultural differences among trading nations.9 In this regard, the 
STCs mechanism under the TBT Committee has been broadly popular among 
WTO members in terms of frequency of its invocation.10 Yet its success, as well 
as the meaning of such success, still remains unarticulated. This Article attempts to 
both conceptualize and measure the success of the STCs mechanism. 
In the preceding example, the TBT Committee may provide a forum in 
which Ukraine, on behalf of its domestic regulatees, cigarette exporters, may 
demand a justification from Australia for the latter’s labeling regulation.11 Ukraine 
may argue that the Australian labeling regulation lacks the scientific justification 
required under the TBT Agreement.12 It is, however, important to note that the 
WTO, in and of itself, is not a “world government.” The WTO cannot simply 
legislate away regulatory heterogeneity. Instead, peer review under a regulatory 
intermediary (the TBT Committee) promotes regulatory dialogue between 
regulators and regulatees. Such regulatory dialogue tends to result in both 
countries familiarizing themselves with each other’s regulatory regime. This 
mutually enhanced awareness between regulators and regulatees as well as the 
consequent regulatory cooperation is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
any regulatory solution. 
It remains an empirical, albeit often extremely complicated, question 
whether such a regulatory intermediary—the TBT Committee—is “effective,” in 
other words, whether it actually delivers any practical solution for the original 
                                                 
8  In this Article, a “binary” regulatory solution refers to a dichotomy of compliance and 
non-compliance (violation) in terms of regulatees’ behavioral responses based largely on utilitarian 
considerations, such as incentives and penalties. It epitomizes a conventional regulatory framework 
under international law. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
9  See SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 120–63. 
10  See Bryce Baschuk, WTO Panel Considers 500th Specific Trade Concern, INT’L TRADE DAILY (Bloomberg 
BNA), Mar. 11, 2016, available at https://perma.cc/WG4P-2TNX. 
11  See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO), Minutes of the Meeting of June 15–16, 2011, 
G/TBT/M/54 (Sep. 20, 2011) (discussing Australia–Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 
(G/TBT/N/AUS/67)).  
12  Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO Members to consider available scientific and 
technical information when preparing technical regulations. “In assessing such risks, relevant 
elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related 
processing technology or intended end-uses of products.” TBT Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 2.2. 
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regulatory dilemma. Confronted by these measurement challenges, one possible 
option might be to assess a regulatory intermediary’s effectiveness through various 
interactions (inquiries and responses) within the TBT Committee and their 
consequences. Note that these consequences do not necessarily mean any 
dramatic behavioral changes toward compliance. They may also include 
expressions of satisfaction, explicit or implicit, from inquirers. If the regulating 
country’s response indeed satisfies the original inquirer, there will be no more 
discussion or dispute. In this regard, the TBT Committee is a regulatory 
“clearinghouse” that channels and manages TBT-related inquiries that exist in the 
form of both a demand for clarification and a complaint about alleged illegality. 
Unlike adjudication through the WTO tribunal, the ultimate goal of the TBT 
Committee is to liquidate those demands or complainants by providing a 
discursive forum. As those STCs are circulated, shared, and peer-reviewed 
(“communitized”) within the TBT Committee among whichever WTO members 
are interested,13 WTO members may familiarize themselves with the regulatory 
practices of their trading partners, better appreciate similarities and differences in 
regulatory approach on the same issue area, and therefore expand both shared 
regulatory grounds and a zone of regulatory tolerance. In this sense, the TBT 
Committee may function as a critical dispute “prevention” mechanism. 
Against this background, our study investigates the TBT Committee data 
spanning the past twenty years. This study aims to achieve two main goals. First, 
it conceptualizes the WTO’s TBT Committee as an intermediary that assists 
regulatory compliance by facilitating regulatory dialogue in a transnational setting, 
crisscrossing domestic and international regulatory jurisdictions. Second, the study 
measures the effectiveness of such a regulatory intermediary by analyzing TBT 
Committee data for the past two decades. 
The TBT Committee data concerns over 400 “specific trade concerns” 
(STCs) raised during the Committee meetings since the launch of the WTO 
system in 1995. We analyzed minutes of those meetings based on various patterns 
of interactions among WTO members in the TBT Committee, such as a 
clarification (fact-finding) request, a complaint questioning the legality of the 
measure in question, a response satisfying the inquiring country, and a vague 
response. We then developed the following hypotheses: 
1. The higher the level of conflict an STC demonstrates, defined by the 
number of WTO members involved, the less likely it is to be eventually 
resolved or satisfied; 
2. The more frequently WTO members discuss a particular regulatory 
issue (STC), the less likely it is to be eventually resolved or satisfied; and 
                                                 
13  Before the TBT Committee, any WTO member may challenge or request clarification on new 
technical regulations (“specific trade concerns”) notified and publicized under the “Technical 
Barriers to Trade Information Management System (TBT IMS).” WTO, TBT Information 
Management System, available at https://perma.cc/3UXM-YLHE.  
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3. A clarification request is more likely to produce a resolution or 
satisfaction than an illegality complaint. 
After we completed coding the data, we evaluated these hypotheses. While 
the full statistical method and results are discussed in detail below, a brief summary 
follows. Ultimately, our data supports our hypotheses with respect to hypotheses 
(2) and (3), but does not support hypothesis (1). Our analysis supports significant 
statistical change in Resolution based on Frequency and Motivation. Ultimately, 
we conclude from the data that for each increase in Frequency, the likelihood of 
Resolution is reduced by approximately 2 percent. Intriguingly, each Legality 
inquiry is associated with an approximately 20 percent reduced likelihood of 
Resolution. These relationships are not strongly correlated, but they do evince the 
trend discussed in the hypotheses.14 
Perhaps most interestingly, this analysis shows us how much we do not 
know, and cannot measure by merely evaluating, summarizing, and coding 
publicly available resources such as WTO and TBT committee meeting minutes. 
For example, we coded the Motivation variable using TBT meeting minutes. In 
doing so, we took into account the specific phrasing used in the minutes as well 
as the general “tone” of an inquiry to determine whether a complaint was primarily 
one of legality or clarification. These inquiries might be further complicated by 
the pre-existing relationship between States. It might be similarly complicated by 
the relationships among State representatives as well as between State and WTO 
staff. As is perhaps obvious, State-to-State—and subordinately, human-to-
human—interaction is endlessly variant while remaining cumulative and iterative. 
Thus, the TBT Committee discourse can be highly complex. In this regard, our 
present data analysis demonstrates the potential challenge in presuming a 
rationalist model,15 which too often is based on monolithically prescriptive and 
proscriptive ideas related to regulatory governance. Instead, the complexity 
inherent in the interstate dialogue reflected by the TBT Committee minutes 
illustrates the need for more information and a more nuanced approach to 
evaluating regulatory intermediaries. Consequently, we will need to further 
contextualize this result by interviewing diplomats and WTO staff who actually 
                                                 
14  “Resolution” refers to a situation in which both an inquiring party and a responding party reached 
a certain solution or agreement, explicit or implicit, regarding the original specific trade concern. 
“Frequency” indicates the total number of rounds of meetings of the TBT Committee in which the 
identical trade concern was raised. “Motivation” concerns the reasons behind the original inquiry: 
it can be either to challenge the WTO-consistency of the technical regulation in question 
(“Legality”) or to seek clarification of the content of such regulation (“Clarification”). Regarding 
further details on the definitions of these variables, see infra Section IV. 
15  The rationalist model of international trade presumes that, given the anarchic world order, WTO 
members participate in the WTO for the sole purpose of advancing their national interests and will 
eschew compliance when compliance is inconvenient. This view aligns neatly with the realist, binary 
view of international politics. See generally SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD 
TRADE, supra note 3, at 49–59. 
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participated in the TBT Committee meetings. This will enable us to gather more 
data and information related to the discursive processes inherent in the WTO 
generally and the TBT committee specifically. 
In sum, this Article generates two broad implications. First, just as 
Newtonian-Einsteinian physics cannot explain ninety-five percent of the universe 
that consists of dark energy and dark matter, the conventional, rationalist model 
cannot fully capture complex state regulatory behaviors without probing the 
discursive and rhetorical exchanges that occur among states. Second, as NTBs 
have increasingly replaced traditional tariff barriers, conventional analytical 
models based on simplistic behavioral assumptions, such as utility maximization, 
can no longer effectively explain NTBs. This follows from the fact that most 
NTBs are embedded in local socio-cultural characteristics. Obviously, these types 
of NTBs may not necessarily be simply bargained away through a reciprocal give-
and-take.16 Under these circumstances, communication must be prioritized over 
incentives when mediation between state parties occurs. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Section II problematizes the conventional 
approach to international regulatory governance by spotlighting its rather 
monolithic assumption on the regulator-regulatee relationship based on a 
rationalist model. Although this regulatory conventionalism brings causality into 
relief, it largely fails to capture the rich social dynamic between regulators and 
regulatees. In response, Section III explores an alternative model of regulatory 
governance in terms of “regulatory intermediaries.” Section III then attempts to 
theorize “communitization” of international regulation. Section IV tests the 
theory of international regulatory communitization by applying it to the TBT 
Committee. The Article concludes that, while the effectiveness of the TBT 
Committee is not unlimited, it certainly signifies an innovative type of 
transnational regulatory governance. 
II.  PROBLEMATIZING TRANSNATIONAL 
REGULATORY  GOVERNANCE 
International organizations (IOs), such as the WTO, suffer from a chronic 
mismatch between their ambitious goals and deficient capacities.17 These capacity 
deficiencies come in diverse forms. Most of all, sovereign countries are reluctant 
to grant direct and hierarchical regulatory authority to IOs.18 Likewise, most IOs 
                                                 
16  See generally Cho, From Control to Communication, supra note 6. 
17  See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries 2 (Aug. 2012), 
https://perma.cc/XD94-GQY8 (observing that international organizations “often lack the 
capabilities to perform the roles they have been nominally allocated”). 
18  Id. at 20 (“States are more likely to impose strict control on IGO independence in core areas of 
national sovereignty.”). 
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lack adequate financial resources with which to hire and invest more in their 
corresponding regulatory areas to fulfill their mandates. While this material 
capacity gap within IOs has been widely discussed, another important gap, a 
“governance gap,” has been relatively underexplored and under-theorized.19 Part 
of the reason behind this paucity is the predominance of the conventional 
regulatory framework, which can be epitomized as a hierarchical, compliance-
based model.20 It is based on a very strong assumption that a regulator is capable 
of directly formulating and executing regulatory policies vis-à-vis regulatory 
targets.21 Naturally, conventional studies on regulation also tend to highlight the 
rationalist dimension of effectiveness of, and compliance with, a given regulation, 
such as enforcement strategies.22 Here, regulatees are often viewed as “amoral 
calculators.”23 The conventional view related to amoral calculators, which is 
informed by neorealists and rational choice theorists, posits that a state would 
comply with regulatory treaties if, and only if, such compliance contributes to its 
utilities (material interest, power, or reputation) or avoids disutilities, such as 
sanctions.24 
In the modern era, while globalization increases interdependency among 
nations, a domestic regulatory authority might still not have effective access to 
relevant regulatory targets in foreign jurisdictions.25 In this complicated 
transnational regulatory situation, the conventional assumption does not hold and 
                                                 
19  Regarding notable exceptions, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: 
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in WALTER MATTLI & NGAIRE WOODS, THE 
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44–88 (2009); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD 
ORDER (2004); WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT 
GOVERNMENT? (1998); James N. Rosenau, Governance in the Twenty-first Century, 1 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 13–43 (1995). 
20  Under the conventional hierarchical regulatory model, “regulation is largely prescriptive and 
compliance is largely based on coercion, deterrence and sanctions.” Kenneth W. Abbott, David 
Levi-Faur, & Duncan Snidal, Intermediaries in Regulatory Governance (Feb. 4, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors), at 1. In the American context, the conventional model was 
typified by a “control-and-command structure,” which is inappropriate and wholly unworkable in 
the voluntary-compliance arena of international relations. See Orley Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall 
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, SAN DIEGO LEGAL STUDIES PAPER 
NO. 07-27 (2004). 
21  Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal, supra note 20, at 4–5. 
22  Susan S. Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer Protection in an Attorney General's Office, 15 L. & SOCIETY REV. 
849 (1981). 
23  Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies, in KEITH HAWKINS & JOHN M. THOMAS, ENFORCING REGULATION 67–95 (1984). 
24  See SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3; Kenneth W. 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 3, at 430. 
25  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: Strategies for 
International Organizations, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 95, 96 (2013). 
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therefore could not remedy the aforementioned mismatch.26 This conventional 
approach is particularly questionable in light of the WTO’s nature and design vis-
à-vis regulatory action. In particular, the TBT committee is shielded from the IO 
design tendency to “institutionalize[ ] the nature of states’ control mechanisms, 
such as the frequency with which government representatives convene for 
oversight meetings.”27 Instead, as part of what Tana Johnson terms “IGO 
[intergovernmental organization] progeny,”28 the TBT’s subsidiarity relative to the 
WTO provides it with greater institutional authority and latitude. This is because, 
as Johnson contends, international bureaucrats factor into the design of regulatory 
IOs in ways that alter the typical cycle of State rationalism.29 In this sense, these 
international bureaucrats subvert the conventional command-and-control 
structure in favor of an increasingly discursive one. This tendency was built into 
the TBT committee in particular and many regulatory IOs generally.30 As such, 
international bureaucrats have “dampened formal mechanisms of state control,”31 
evincing the important role played by these bureaucrats within their organization. 
In sum, the conventional view simply brackets another important dimension of 
regulatory governance in which a regulatee state’s action is guided not simply by 
calculation but by socialization. This socialization includes learning and persuasion 
often provided by international bureaucrats and other soft institutions including 
the TBT Committee. 
Likewise, the conventional view often regards the WTO as a “contract” 
between Member States subject to ordinary rules of damages like efficient 
breach.32 However, the conventional view tends to misrepresent the genuine 
nature of compliance under the WTO system. For example, compliance can be 
viewed as having a dual nature embodied in first and second order compliance. 
First order compliance is similar to contractual remedy conceptualized by the 
conventional model, while second order compliance relates to the systematic 
                                                 
26  Abbott, Levi-Faur, & Snidal, supra note 20, at 4–5. “Business is increasingly global, operating 
through affiliates in multiple countries, lengthy and opaque transnational supply chains, and other 
complicated structures that span regulatory boundaries.” See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 25, at 
96.  
27  TANA JOHNSON, ORGANIZATIONAL PROGENY: WHY GOVERNMENTS ARE LOSING CONTROL OVER 
THE PROLIFERATING STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 4 (2014). 
28  Id. at 6. 
29  Id. at 5. 
30  See Cho, Norms and Discourse, supra note 7, at 700–702 (discussing the “peer review” mechanism 
under the WTO system, including the one conducted within the TBT Committee).  
31  JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 23. 
32  Regarding the origin of the world trade contract, see SUNGJOON CHO, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 11–15; see also Gregory Shaffer, How the World Trade Organization 
Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2015). 
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development of rules and regulatory proceedings.33 Importantly, second order 
compliance is not a command-and-control relationship. Instead, as Gregory 
Shaffer notes, these frameworks are formed through a gradual and iterative 
process of adherence, break, and calcification.34 
Indeed, the inherent ambiguity of key WTO terms, such as “discriminatory” 
or “unjustifiable,” has rendered rationalist interpretations of regulation (such as 
the “stimulus-response” model) unsatisfactory.35 These economic models make 
the deceptively clear assumption that these regulatory agencies and participants 
compete to create “optimal levels of enforcement.”36 In the context of collective 
discussion and debate surrounding what is discriminatory or unjustifiable, this 
assumption too often ignores the more subtle interpretive issues involved. Take, 
for example, a hypothetical TBT inquiry brought by China. Say China has 
misgivings on a new U.S. regulation related to acceptable lead levels in children’s 
toys. China points to the international standard and claims that the U.S. regulation 
is unjustifiable. The U.S. replies that it has its own misgivings about the validity of 
the international standard. Is the U.S. discriminating against Chinese toys? If so, 
is such discrimination justifiable? Answers to these questions are not 
predetermined; they are subject to rhetorical processes such as argument and 
persuasion within the institutional context of the TBT Committee, unless the 
question is eventually adjudicated through the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism.37  
The conventional model becomes even more problematic when faced with 
an iterative self-regulatory process such as the TBT Committee. The TBT 
Committee must develop delicate regulatory strategies that are both suitable to its 
limited authority (such as peer review) and flexible enough to be accepted by 
WTO members.38 In the preceding example, the U.S. may rebuff Chinese 
                                                 
33  See Shaffer, supra note 32. 
34  “The frames, however, are not simply given. They are rather shaped over time through recursive 
rounds of engagement among actors with differing epistemologies and interests at different levels 
of governance. In practice, the positions taken by state representatives in the WTO are often more 
of a mercantilist nature, as they defend both their export and their import-competing business 
interests. This provides an opening for contestation and argumentation in which officials must 
simultaneously look at their own practices when challenging others’. Government representatives 
before the WTO’s network of councils and committees engage in sustained deliberation, and, in 
this way, are subject to persuasion and learning.” Id. at 16. 
35  Julien Etienne, Ambiguity and Relation Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships, 7 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 30, 30 (2013). 
36  Id.  
37  Regarding the delicate relationship between peer review, as manifested in the TBT Committee, and 
adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see Cho, Norms and Discourse, supra note 7, 
at 685. 
38  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 25, at 97. 
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entreaties. But, what about the next instance? And the instance after that? As 
rounds of regulatory dialogue continue in the TBT Committee, the U.S. and China 
may be able to produce some kind of regulatory rapprochement in the form of a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU). With this hypothetical example in mind, 
we can conceptualize the discursive nature of the WTO. Here, a discursive process 
marks the most significant departure from the conventional model and requires a 
new analytical framework. For example, the most salient aspects of law or legality 
embedded in the regulation derive from its everyday operation.39 A domestic 
regulator, which may be an importing country in the TBT context, and regulatees, 
which may be foreign producers represented by exporting countries in the TBT 
context, interpret and reflect on each other’s behaviors in the collective yet 
uncelebrated routine interactions between them. Sometimes, they learn from each 
other and form a strong partnership based on shared regulatory grounds. 
Indubitably, this successful socialization augurs well in terms of effectiveness and 
compliance, although they may fail some other times. 
In fact, the aforementioned emphasis on a discursive, rhetorical regulatory 
process is not new. Some scholars have already developed a new model of 
regulatory governance in the same line. For example, the concept of “responsive 
regulation” was created as a sort of “third way”: a “symbiosis between state 
regulation and self-regulation,” in the context of domestic regulatory agencies 
specifically.40 These domestic regulatory agencies were tasked with orienting their 
activities based on “two pyramids: a hierarchy of sanctions and a hierarchy of 
regulatory strategies of varying degrees of interventionism.”41 Obviously these 
types of hierarchies are unavailable in the increasingly transnational business age. 
With issues becoming increasingly intertwined with international politics, and 
business transversing the conventional boundaries of States, domestic regulators 
cannot reach out to all potential regulatees, such as foreign producers in foreign 
countries.42 For that reason, “responsive regulation” as an international regulatory 
concept has had to adapt to survive. The most important evolution of responsive 
regulation relates to activities known as “transnational regulatory standard-
setting” (TRSS).43 These activities include “orchestration,” which entails an IO 
                                                 
39  Garry C. Gray & Susan S. Silbey, The Other Side of the Compliance Relationship, in EXPLAINING 
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 123 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann 
Nielsen eds., 2011) (discussing the “habitual quotidian enactment”). 
40  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 25, at 96. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 97. 
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using its own capacities to influence, encourage, and sometimes even ‘enforce’ self 
or multi-stakeholder regulation.44 
Furthermore, new literature has suggested that focusing on procedural 
aspects of regulation could provide a palliative to the woes of present-day 
regulatory bodies. Kristina Murphy et al. suggest that the “use of threat and legal 
authority, particularly when perceived as unreasonable, can produce the opposite 
behavior from that sought . . . [including] overt opposition.”45 Murphy et al. 
propose that parties who follow out of “obligation rather than out of fear” are 
more likely to comply with regulatory organizations.46 The authors conducted 
several studies on domestic regulatory agencies, including a study on the 
Australian social security system.47 They concluded that “procedural justice was 
found to be more important for nurturing compliance when people questioned 
the legitimacy of the laws they were being asked to comply with.”48 These findings 
related to procedural justice illustrate that IOs must also maintain a good sense of 
their own legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. Certainly procedural justice 
is a solid goal to strive for in the IO regulatory context. In this regard, the TBT 
Committee operates as a forum in which such procedural justice is delivered 
through transparency, notification, enquiries, and reason giving. 
III.  TOWARD A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL 
REGULATORY  COMMUNITIZATION  
As a result of the complicated transnational regulatory regime and the 
failures of the conventional model to offer solutions, the need to address such 
complexities through more innovative forms of regulatory discourse becomes 
apparent. In this Section, we discuss an alternative model of regulatory governance 
through “regulatory intermediaries,” including the role of the TBT Committee as 
a regulatory intermediary. We then explore a theory of “communitization” of 
international regulation, which hypothesizes that transnational participation in 
regulatory discourse creates a useful social framework for understanding and 
evaluating regulatory solutions. 
                                                 
44  Id. at 97–98. 
45  Kristina Murphy, et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective When People Question 
the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2009). 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 11–14.  
48  Id. at 18. 
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A.  Transnational Regulatory Intermediaries (TRI)  
Facing the aforementioned governance gap left by the conventional model, 
we need an innovative regulatory framework under which we can experiment with 
various models based on discursive regulatory processes, such as argument, 
persuasion, deliberation, and learning. One promising way of thinking in this 
direction comes from the concept of “orchestration,” which Kenneth Abbott et 
al. developed.49 Breaking from the conventional command-and-control model, 
Abbott et al. envision a middle actor (“intermediary”) that can bridge or 
coordinate between an original regulator (“orchestrator”) and a regulatee 
(“target”).50 In this orchestration model, a regulator (orchestrator) “creates, 
supports and integrates a multi-actor system of soft and indirect governance 
geared towards shared goals that neither orchestrator nor intermediaries could 
achieve on their own.”51 Importantly, certain professional intermediaries possess 
critical governance capacities, such as “technical expertise” and “direct access to 
targets.”52 By mobilizing these epistemic advantages of those intermediaries, IOs 
can orchestrate an indirect yet effective regulatory pathway in which members 
(targets) coordinate their preferences to meet IOs’ normative goals. 
In this regard, the TBT Committee can be deemed a “transnational 
regulatory intermediary (TRI)” to the WTO (orchestrator). Notably, 
“[o]rchestration can also steer . . . internal forms of governance that reflect 
democratic principles and promote internal contestability, increasing the 
representativeness, deliberativeness, and legitimacy.”53 In the TBT context 
specifically, Article 13.1 of the TBT Agreement defines the mission of the TBT 
Committee as “[f]or the purpose of affording Members the opportunity of 
consulting on any matters relating to the operation of this Agreement or the 
furtherance of its objectives, and [the TBT Committee] shall carry out such 
responsibilities as assigned to it under this Agreement or by the Members.” 
Note that the nature of discussion topics (“specific trade concerns”) in the 
TBT Committee is highly technical.54 Naturally, participants of the TBT 
Committee include sector-specific government officials from national regulatory 
and standardizing bodies who hold technical expertise in given regulatory areas.55 
                                                 
49  Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 2; Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal, supra note 20, at 4–5. 
50  Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 2. 
51  Id. at 3. 
52  Id. 
53  Abbott & Snidal (2013), supra note 25, at 107. 
54  WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade, https://perma.cc/4AK7-QEAA (last visited May 9, 2016). 
55  WTO, THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 28 (2014). 
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The TBT Committee’s characteristic “operational capacity”56 includes providing a 
peer review forum for WTO members, socializing them within the context of the 
TBT community, and eventually facilitating their implementation of the TBT 
Agreement. Importantly, the TBT Committee retains a direct—not necessarily 
diplomatic, yet more importantly professional—access to targets, such as issue-
specific domestic authorities subject to the TBT disciplines.57 This epistemic 
connection is critical in securing the effective implementation of, or compliance 
with, the TBT Agreement by WTO members.58  
Certainly the TRI model is based on certain assumptions. One of the key 
assumptions is that the parties are working—in good faith—within a structure 
that actually has the capacity to support the collaborative development of 
regulations. Christine Parker appropriately characterizes these assumptions as 
significant facial challenges to the theory of responsive regulation.59 Is this, as 
Parker herself asks, too optimistic a presumption to form the basis of a coherent 
and persuasive regulatory regime?60 Why would any State choose to be involved 
with, much less adhere to, such a complex system?  
To answer these questions in turn, we first think this presumption might not 
be overly optimistic. Assuredly, some noncompliance occurs. Yet the open nature 
of promulgating these regulations, with repeated interactions allowing for group 
learning and consensus-building on a global basis, incentivizes continued 
participation. Second, the complexity of an IO regulatory system encourages 
further State participation precisely because it is discursive. Its variable nature 
ensures that States will always find one reason or another to work within the 
international system. In this regard, the TBT Committee tends to warrant the TRI 
model assumption.  
As a regulatory intermediary, the TBT Committee does not directly 
command WTO members’ compliance with TBT obligations or discipline 
violations. Rather, the TBT Committee provides a discursive forum in which 
WTO members can freely exchange information on their regulatory experiences, 
                                                 
56  Abbott, Levi-Faur, & Snidal, supra note 20, at 6. 
57  Id. 
58  Shaffer, supra note 32, at 1 (highlighting the WTO’s transnational regulatory governance that affects 
“changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation”).  
59  “[Responsive regulation] tends to assume that the kind of social relationships, opportunities for 
free and equal deliberation, and substantively just law that it seeks to create already exist. . . . That 
is, responsive regulation assumes that there are enough regulators, regulated businesses and third 
parties who are genuinely committed to the public interest, willing and able to communicate with 
one another to resolve problems, imaginative enough to come up with ‘win win’ solutions to make 
it possible and that they then have sufficient capacity and an appropriate substantively just law to 
enable them to implement those solutions.” Christine Parker, Twenty Years of Responsive Regulation: 
An Appreciation and Appraisal, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 2, 9 (2013). 
60  Id. 
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raise questions on any problematic regulatory practices, persuade other members 
into better regulatory practices, clarify or defend their own regulatory decisions, 
and eventually nurture a culture of cooperation among members in the TBT area.61 
This non-hierarchical mode of governance is effective in the sense that the TBT 
Committee can acculturate WTO members to the normative goals of the TBT 
Agreement, i.e., reconciliation between regulatory autonomy and free trade values. 
The TBT Committee often resolves disputes before they escalate and reach the 
WTO tribunal for formal adjudication. Indeed, this “forward-looking” nature, in 
other words, early detection of trade disputes and their diffusion in a preemptive 
manner via dialogue, is characteristic of the TBT Committee.62 The steady rise of 
the number of specific trade concerns raised in the TBT Committee annually, 
from four in 1995 to ninety-four in 2012, eloquently demonstrates members’ 
perception of effectiveness, and therefore their trust in this indirect, non-
hierarchical mode of governance.63 
Admittedly, the TBT Committee might diverge from typical intermediaries 
in that the WTO did not actually coopt or outsource (“enlist”) it, as it did in the 
case of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) under the TBT 
Agreement.64 In contrast, the WTO “insourced” the TBT Committee as it 
formally institutionalized it in the TBT Agreement.65 In this regard, one might be 
tempted to characterize the relationship between the WTO and the TBT 
Committee as “delegation” in terms of a principal-agent relationship. 
Nonetheless, the WTO does not directly control day-to-day operations of the 
TBT Committee, nor is their relationship borne by a contract.66 The TBT 
Committee retains a fairly independent space in its operation from the direct 
control of the WTO (the General Council). Moreover, the WTO provides the 
TBT Committee with both “material” (budget and personnel) and “ideational” 
(institutionalization) support.67 In sum, orchestration appears to be a better 
characterization of the relationship between the WTO and the TBT Committee. 
Interestingly, what distinguishes the TBT Committee from other types of 
intermediaries is its “(soft)-rulemaking” function. For example, in its triennial 
                                                 
61  See Abbott, Levi-Faur, & Snidal, supra note 20, at 1 (observing that intermediaries can play a role in 
“building communities of assurances, trust and compliance”). 
62  THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES, supra note 55, at 32. 
63  Id. at 29; Record Number of New Trade Concerns Raised in Standards Committee in 2014, WTO NEWS (Nov. 
4–6, 2014).  
64  Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 8. 
65  TBT Agreement, supra note 5, at art. 13. 
66  For example, the TBT Committee is enabled to make an independent decision in granting 
developing countries “specified, time-limited exceptions” from the TBT obligations. Id. at art. 12.8. 
67  Id. at art. 13. (“The Committee . . . shall carry out such responsibilities as assigned to it under this 
Agreement or by the Members.”).  
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review mandated in Article 15.4 of the TBT Agreement, the TBT Committee 
developed a variety of targeted soft-law products, such as guidelines or 
recommendations, in areas of international standards and good regulatory 
practices.68 These guidelines and recommendations are voluntary and sector-
specific. Admittedly, this soft lawmaking is not so much new rulemaking from 
scratch as it is a “translation” of existing norms, such as the TBT Agreement.69 In 
2012, the TBT Committee agreed to establish a voluntary mechanism to promote 
good regulatory practice by “assessing policy options, including the need to 
regulate (e.g. how to evaluate the impact of alternatives through an evidence-based 
process, including through the use of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) 
tools).”70 Needless to say, this rulemaking function of the TBT Committee 
facilitates WTO members’ implementation of the TBT Agreement, which aligns 
with the WTO’s main goal. In this sense, the TBT Agreement tends to confirm 
the “intermediary availability hypothesis,” which predicts that “governance actors 
are more likely to orchestrate when intermediaries with correlated goals and 
complementary capabilities are available,” as well as the “orchestrator focality 
hypothesis,” which predicts that “governance actors are more likely to orchestrate 
when they are focal within the relevant issue area.”71 
In sum, the orchestration model departs from the so-called “Old 
Governance”72 framework (that is, the hierarchical, top-down regulatory model 
via treaties and intergovernmental organizations) in another critical aspect. While 
the conventional model views an IO as a tool for Member States in pursuing 
certain regulatory goals, the orchestration model defines an IO as an autonomous 
actor that plans the orchestration and recruits intermediaries in a strategic sense. 
B.  TRI and International Regulatory Communitization  
Departing from the conventional command-and-control (enforcement) 
model, transnational regulatory communitization focuses on “communication,” 
which connotes learning, tolerance, and acculturation among transnational 
regulators and regulatees within the TBT context. This social framework is 
particularly useful in understanding and evaluating regulatory solutions between 
                                                 
68  THE WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES, supra note 55, at 30. 
69  Abbott, Levi-Faur & Snidal, supra note 20, at 9.  
70  WTO, Sixth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade Under Article 15.4, G/TBT/32, 29 November 2012, ¶ 4. 
71  Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 15. 
72  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 520–32 (2009). 
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transnational regulators and regulatees in a situation where the conventional 
centralized regulatory authority is absent.73  
Notably, the TBT Agreement concerns meta-regulation in the sense that TBT 
aims to regulate WTO members’ technical regulations through various means. 
Most of these means are “procedural” in nature in that TBT requires WTO 
members to take a certain course of action or procedure, rather than prescribing 
substantive criteria to be met. As Ayres and Braithwaite described as the “minimal 
sufficiency” principle, “the more regulation relies on moral suasion rather than 
punishment, the more effective it will be, especially at inducing internalization and 
thus long-term compliance.”74 For example, the TBT agreement requires WTO 
members to publish and notify its new TBT measures in a timely manner as well 
as to respond to inquiries from other members concerning such measures.75 
Indeed, many of those procedural obligations are performed in the peer review 
under the auspices of the TBT Committee. 
The regulatory core of these procedural provisions—transparency—
eloquently demonstrates a “public” nature of the TBT regime. Rather than 
bilaterally disposing of regulatory issues between complaining and responding 
parties, it shares and “communitizes” regulatory problems among WTO 
members. In this regard, a regulatory “solution” under this communitization 
model is distinguishable from that of a conventional solution. If the latter 
concerns a binary notion of full compliance (repeal of a measure in question) 
versus violation (maintenance of the measure), the former envisions a spectrum 
of constructive, if not dramatic, behaviors, including enhanced cooperation 
toward better understanding of one’s regulatory goals and information sharing. 
Indeed, many of the titular violations under the conventional view may be 
unintentional due to lack of information or capacity, as Chayes and Chayes 
emphasized in their “management” model of international regulation.76 Under 
these circumstances, cooperation based on dialogue can be a better solution than 
coercion or retaliation. Likewise, respondents (regulating countries) tend to value 
the opportunity to defend their positions within the institution (the TBT 
Committee) regardless of whether their justifications are accepted. These non-
instrumental factors, which may be labeled “relational criteria,” enhance the 
general sense of fairness and legitimacy among WTO members and therefore 
contribute to the WTO governance.77 
                                                 
73  Gray & Silbey, supra note 39, at 123. 
74  Abbott & Snidal (2013), supra note 25, at 107. 
75  TBT Agreement, supra note 5, at arts. 10, 13.  
76  ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). 
77  TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 276 (2006). 
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For the purpose of this project, we define “solution” as some level of 
understanding/satisfaction that would be enough to stop the original inquiring 
party from pursuing any further action in a given matter. By this, we might be able 
to claim that parties concerned have reached some kind of mutual understanding 
via communication. Then, we can identify what kinds of factors contribute to such 
solutions.78 This redefinition of solution may even accommodate regulatory 
tolerance, in addition to conformity. 
The aforementioned communitization model and its new notion of 
regulatory solution gain particular traction in the era of uncertainty. While this 
uncertainty itself constitutes a daunting challenge to the global trading system, 
diverging modes of addressing such uncertainty among WTO members may 
function as serious trade barriers. For example, some WTO members may be 
more risk-averse than others in responding to scientific uncertainty in regulating 
genetically modified organisms or hormone-treated beef. In this situation, 
providing market participants (producers, consumers, investors) with adequate 
information is vital in adequately communicating regulatory risks involved in 
global trade.79 The communitization model corresponds to this emerging need in 
the trade and regulation nexus. 
IV.  A  CASE STUDY :  THE WTO  TBT  COMMITTEE  
Given our departure from the conventional model as it becomes increasingly 
unsuitable to address contemporary trade realities, we must evaluate the 
alternative model of regulatory governance via regulatory intermediaries by 
attempting to measure the effectiveness, if any, of communitization. Here, we test 
the theory of international regulatory communitization by applying it to the TBT 
Committee and attempting to measure, and evaluate, the Committee’s 
effectiveness as a regulatory intermediary. 
A.  Measuring the Effectiveness of a Transnational 
Regulatory Intermediary 
As discussed above, the TBT Committee’s unique epistemic advantages 
qualify the Committee to be characterized as a regulatory intermediary. Its 
technical nature is attested to by the fact that the WTO delegations in Geneva 
                                                 
78  Such factors include the subject matter, parties concerned (developing or developed countries etc.), 
number of parties concerned, whether a notification triggered the inquiry, duration of 
communication, etc.  
79  The Application of Risk Communication to Food Standards and Safety Matters, WHO (1998), 
https://perma.cc/MS2F-ZQUG. 
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often bring experts from their headquarters to the Committee meetings.80 Also, 
its workman-like operation allows the Committee to often be chaired by second-
level Geneva-based diplomats, while participants facilitate their communication 
by refraining from the use of legalese.81 Its professionalism, which might translate 
into de-politicization, tends to self-legitimate its operation, as evidenced by its 
ever-increasing use by WTO members. 
Figure 1: Review of Measures by TBT Committee82 
Despite its obvious popularity, measuring a TRI’s actual effectiveness still 
appears challenging. Notably, Abbott et al. aptly observe that: 
[E]ffectiveness is difficult to evaluate, because one must determine what goals 
are being pursued and consider the counterfactuals: what might have 
happened without orchestration and what alternative governance strategies 
might have achieved. Such factors are easier to evaluate in specific cases, 
where experts with detailed case knowledge can consider such contextual 
circumstances.83 
                                                 
80  Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Erik N. Wijkstrom, In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing Specific 
Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 729, 754 (2013). 
81  Id. It should be noted that the TBT does not ban the use of such legalese per se, but the TBT 
Committee does emphasize the importance of efficiency and streamlining TBT Committee 
discussions. In 2009, for example, in response to the “accelerated growth” in the number of STCs 
raised at TBT Committee meetings, as well as in the number of WTO Members raising concerns 
or substantively supporting other Member’s concerns, the TBT Committee emphasized the 
importance of making communications among Members more efficient. See WTO, Minutes of the 
Meeting of November 13, 2009, G/TBT/26 (Nov. 13, 2009), ¶¶ 67–68. 
82  WTO, Sixth Triennial Review, supra note 70, at 10.  
83  Abbott et al., supra note 17, at 21. 
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Therefore, in evaluating the effectiveness of the TBT Committee qua 
intermediary one must consider its discursive format and normative goal of 
transparency.84 In other words, within the context of the TBT Committee, one 
might attempt to assess its effectiveness through inquiries and responses and their 
consequences. Note that those consequences do not necessarily entail compliant 
behavioral changes from WTO members. They also include expressions of 
satisfaction, explicit or implicit through acquiescence, from inquiring members. 
Here, one must understand the fundamental “relational” nature of TBT 
regulation. Although there are certain prescriptive rules, both substantive and 
procedural, under the TBT Agreement, those rules are triggered if, and only if, a 
certain WTO member raises an issue concerning them, for example in terms of a 
“specific trade concern.”85 There is no centralized review mechanism governed 
directly by the WTO General Council or the Secretariat. If a particular response 
indeed satisfies the original inquirer, there will be no more discussion or dispute. 
In this regard, the TBT Committee is a regulatory “clearinghouse” that channels 
and manages TBT-related inquiries that exist in the form of both a demand for 
clarification and a complaint about alleged illegality.86 Unlike adjudication through 
the WTO tribunal, the ultimate goal of the TBT Committee is to liquidate those 
grievances by providing a discursive forum. In this sense, the TBT Committee 
may function as a dispute “prevention” mechanism.87 
Given that the main regulatory focus under the TBT Committee lies in 
procedural—rather than substantive—disciplines, such as transparency, it would 
be infeasible to define “regulatory specifications”88 that may function as baselines 
in evaluating effectiveness of the TBT Committee’s contribution to the attainment 
of such procedural disciplines. Rather, as a meta-regulation, the TBT regulation 
monitored by the TBT Committee can be characterized as “relational regulation” 
that aims to manage compliant behaviors within an “acceptable range of 
variation,” rather than completely eliminating the gap between an ideal regulatory 
status and actual performance.89 As an “ongoing production of organizational and 
material life through a network of interdependent human transactions,” the TBT 
Committee embraces the “impossibility of perfect conformity between 
abstract . . . rules . . . and situated action.”90 Here, regulatory dialogue, such as 
                                                 
84  Id. 
85  See TBT Information Management System, supra note 13.  
86  Horn et al., supra note 80, at 730. 
87  RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 573–74 (Tracey Epps 
& Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013). 
88  Ruthanne Huising & Susan S. Silbey, Governing the Gap: Forging Safe Science through Relational Regulation, 
5 REG. & GOVERNANCE 14, 14 (2011). 
89  Id. at 15–16. 
90  Id. at 16. 
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inquiries and responses, form an essential toolkit for governing compliance with 
those procedural regulations (such as transparency and notification) under the 
TBT Agreement. 
B.  The Data 
Measuring the overall effectiveness of the TBT Committee requires a 
nuanced understanding of “resolution.” The only relevant reference available in 
this regard is Horn et al.’s definition of resolution under the TBT Committee. 
Their definition of resolution is rather liberal. They observe that: 
In the . . . TBT Committee[ ], a Member, or a group of Members, engage in 
a dialogue with other Member(s) concerning a specific policy measure; there 
is an exchange of information and views, and concerned Member(s) can rest 
the case if they so desire, for instance if they are sufficiently convinced 
concerning the legality of the measure; or, they can request a change in the 
contested measure—or in the light of explanations and clarification the 
challenging Members may decide not to pursue the matter further. As a result 
of the information obtained, or of the change in the policy, the concerned 
Member may decide on its own that the matter has been resolved, even 
though similar decisions are void of any formalism. Thus, some form of 
settlement takes place also in the case of STCs.91 
Although their definition of resolution appears plausible, its explanatory 
force remains limited as a proxy of effectiveness, in particular within the unique 
context of the TBT Committee as a regulatory intermediary. The TBT-specific 
effectiveness concerns not so much any radical convergence or harmonization 
toward a particular regulatory standard as it does a “communitization” of 
regulatory concerns. Such communitization involves a deep understanding of 
others’ regulatory situations, concretization of any differences, exploration of 
possible common grounds, and minimization, if not elimination, of negative trade 
impacts. Indeed, various procedural obligations under the TBT Agreement, such 
as transparency, notification, and reason giving, tend to warrant this 
communitization goal by collectivizing particular trade-regulatory concerns and 
sharing them among WTO members in a discursive fashion.92 
Against this background, we coded over 400 specific trade concerns (STCs) 
collected from the WTO TBT website93 according to the following sequence and 
criteria: first, we categorized main dialogues (communications) on STCs within 
the TBT Committee. 
 
                                                 
91  Horn et al., supra note 80, at 749.  
92  Cho, Norms and Discourse, supra note 7, at 700 (“[B]y framing their inquiries and responses within the 
context and terms of WTO norms, both an inquirer and a respondent transmit WTO norms to 
each other.”).  
93  WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 54. 
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Table 1: Communication Codes on STCs within the TBT Committee 
Code Category 
AS some state would be adopting an international standard 
C TBT complaint 
CC complaint was ongoing 
CL complaint about legitimacy (of a measure) 
CN complaint about lack of required notification 
CUN complaint that measure was unnecessary for stated goal 
D delay 
IS invoked international standards 
K committee would continue to work 
R the response 
RI member requesting more information 
RV measure was voluntary instrument; not subject to TBT 
S solution had been reached 
S? solution seemed unclear 
SC solution had to be clarified 
SCO solution was for parties to have further communication 
SX solution required some sort of change 
WO some state was withholding its opinion 
 
Based on this categorization, we classified all STCs into two groups: (1) 
resolved and (2) not resolved. For example, “S” or “SCO” can be classified as 
resolved, while “D” or “SC” is classified as unresolved. Some styled typologies 
can illustrate our classifications. First, “resolved” connotes the following patterns: 
1.) State X requests State Y provide information. State Y agrees to provide 
a direct answer in the form of more recent information and to refer remaining 
questions to State Y’s authorities for further replies.94 
a. Example: Data Point (DP) 3 – Mexico 
2.) State X requests State Y provide information. State Y, either 
immediately or at some later time, tells the Committee that State Y has 
provided a direct response to State X and will provide similar responses 
bilaterally. 
a. Example: DP 204 – EC 
                                                 
94  This follows Horn et al.’s definition of “resolution” in that we are not looking at a formalistic 
“resolution” (i.e., not all problems are completely resolved), but rather that some agreeable progress 
has been made between the parties.  
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3.) State X requests State Y to provide information. State Y, either 
immediately or at some later time, tells the Committee that State Y and State 
X will continue discussions bilaterally. 
a. Example: DP 4 – U.S. 
4.) State X requests postponement of standards implementation or other 
measures by State Y. State Y either [1] agrees in part, or [2] expresses a 
willingness to discuss the matter further bilaterally.95 
a. Example: DP 106 – U.S. 
5.) State X voices a concern with State Y’s standard. State Y [1] notes that 
State X’s issue has been brought before State Y’s authorities; [2] provides 
some sort of explanation; and/or [3] informs State X that the specific concern 
will be addressed and a determination made soon.96 
a. Example: DP 255 – Israel 
In contrast, “unresolved” connotes the following patterns: 
1.) State X requests State Y provide information. State Y refuses to provide 
that information or says that State Y cannot provide that information at the 
present time. 
a. Example: DP 4 – U.S. 
2.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s proposed or adopted standard. 
State Y counters by justifying State Y’s regulation or otherwise dismissing 
State X’s concern. (Optional: State X expresses dissatisfaction with State Y’s 
answer.) 
a. Example: DP 6 – EC 
3.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s standard. State Y takes note 
of State X’s concern, but takes no further action.97 
a. Example: DP 155 – China 
4.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s standard. After repeated 
discussion, State X still believes, or a third country (State Z) believes, that the 
standard is unfairly biased.98 
a. Example: DP 135 – Norway 
5.) State X voices a concern about State Y’s standard. After some 
discussion, State Y merely reiterates that the regulation has not been fully 
decided upon yet.99 
a. Example: DP 303 – Indonesia 
Furthermore, we classified all the STCs into two large groups in accordance 
with the “motivation” of initial inquiries: seeking information/clarification or 
remedial changes. In our database, the code for the first occasion is “CN”; the 
code for the second one is “CL.” However, some STCs may not have either code, 
                                                 
95  This partial resolution follows our broader definition of “resolution.” 
96  Here, we illustrate that one of our primary considerations is the reconciliatory mechanism, rather 
than the ultimate policy change, inherent in the TBT process. 
97  Here, the response is in fact a “cutting off” of communication. 
98  Within our typology, this type represents an insufficient resolution. 
99  This primarily represents a delaying tactic distinguished from the “Yes” type that also includes 
invitation or solicitation for more discussion, either bilaterally or through the TBT committee. 
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in which case we should give them one. Our presumption is that there is both a 
legality and a clarification purpose to almost all TBT inquiries. Very few are purely 
one or the other, though we have observed among “friendly” states that there is 
occasionally a pure question by State X as to what State Y intends. So, in the 
typology below, we operate on the presumption that one or the other 
predominates. “Legality” connotes the following patterns: 
1.) State X challenges State Y’s standard on the basis that it does not 
conform with international standards.100 
a. Example: DP 11 – Canada 
2.) State X believes State Y’s standard is an unnecessary obstacle to trade 
under the existing rules/agreements. 
a. Example: DP 197 – Germany 
3.) State X draws attention to State Y’s pending or proposed regulations 
and states that they believe they are unacceptable under present international 
standards/are illegal under present standards.101 
a. Example: DP 206 – EC 
“Clarification” connotes the following patterns: 
1.) State X requests information about the application of State Y’s 
standard. 
a. Example: DP 23 – Korea 
2.) State X draws attention to State Y’s pending or proposed regulations 
and asks whether they will be altered based on State X’s or State Z’s 
comments. 
a. Example: DP 201 – China 
3.) State X notes that it is waiting on State Y’s response to a previously 
raised issue.102 
a. Example: DP 24 – Mexico 
Finally, according to Horn et al., “serious” STCs are those resulting in two 
or more committee meetings. However, our database focuses on the “frequency” 
or the number of relays or communications between inquirers and respondents. 
Against this background, we developed the following hypotheses: 
1.) The higher the level of conflict an STC demonstrates, defined by the 
number of WTO members involved, the less likely it is to be eventually 
resolved or satisfied 
2.) The more frequently WTO members discuss a particular regulatory 
issue (STC), the less likely it is to be resolved. 
3.) A clarification request from a potential regulatee is more likely to 
produce a solution, or resolution (satisfaction), than an illegality complaint.  
                                                 
100  While the phraseology is relatively gentle, the fundamental issue is that there is an existing standard 
that Norway believes does not conform. 
101  Here, the underlying motivation is to merely challenge the proposed regulation rather than to get a 
response regarding an already challenged regulation. 
102  In this instance, even if the original basis was legality, the present motivation is clarification. 
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C. Analysis 
We begin with a notable caveat. 
Figure 2: Pearson’s r Correlation: 
  L F M R 
Level of 
Conflict ("L") 1    
Frequency 
("F") 0.516775 1   
Motivation 
("M") 0.130437 0.149691 1  
Resolution 
("R") -0.09264 -0.13684 -0.22882 1 
Figure 2 shows a Pearson’s r correlation output—a correlation typified by 
linear dependence—among all variables. As illustrated, L, F, and M are only 
weakly correlated with R. Nonetheless, this Figure does demonstrate the existence 
of linear relationships of varying degrees. This means that we can demonstrate 
some relationship between the variables, albeit not a strong relationship. Take, for 
example, the relationship between Motivation (M) and Resolution (R). We can see 
that there is a weak negative relationship between these variables. That is to say, 
from the correlation coefficient we can see that a “legality” motivation, as opposed 
to a “clarification” motivation, is more likely to produce a result that does not end 
in successful resolution, as defined by our typology. 
Admittedly, this correlation alone does not tell us what amount of change 
these variables cause in one another. In essence, it still does not tell us the extent 
of their relationship. Nor does it tell us if this relationship is statistically significant. 
To accomplish that goal, we proceeded with single linear regressions and a 
multiple regression with Level of Conflict (L), Frequency (F), and Motivation (M) 
as X to our common Y, Resolution (R). 
Figure 3: X = L (Level of Conflict) 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT      
Regression 
Statistics      
Multiple R 
0.09263837
1     
R Square 
0.00858186




3     
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2     
Observation
s 406     
      
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 





Residual 404 93.2421428 0.230797   




Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.698150542 0.04113396 16.97261 3.68E-49 
Level of 
Conflict - Types of 
Countries Involved 
(E.U./U.S. = 4; BRIC 
= 3; Regional = 2; 
LDC = 1; Other or 
N/A = 0) -0.005552939 0.00296941 -1.87005 0.0622 
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Figure 3 shows the output of a linear regression where X is Level of Conflict 
(L)103 and Y is Resolution (R). L represents the weakest relationship with R. As 
noted by Figure 2, L had an extremely weak negative correlation with R of 
approximately -.09. Linear regression illustrates how much change in R is due to 
L—here, approximately .008, or 0.8 percent. Interestingly, the coefficient value 
demonstrates that with each point increase (e.g., 1 to 2) in L, the likelihood of R 
actually increases by .05 percent. Additionally, the p-value of approximately .0622 
is below our 90 percent confidence interval of .10.  
At first blush, these results seem to show that we can be 90 percent 
confident, or greater,104 that Level of Conflict (L) is the variable actually causing 
the 0.8 percent of change we noted above. Specifically, it indicates that each single 
unit increase in Level of Conflict actually increases the likelihood of resolution by 
.05 percent. However, as will be demonstrated below in Figure 6, we cannot 
ultimately use these results because they are not statistically significant when 
compared alongside the other variables. For that reason, we cannot support our 
first hypothesis that the higher the level of conflict an STC demonstrates, defined 
                                                 
103  This is coded per the above as the relative ‘weight’ given an issue by number of countries and their 
economic significance.  
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by the number of WTO members involved, the less likely it is to be eventually 
resolved or satisfied. 
Figure 4: X=F (Frequency) 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT      
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.136842     
R Square 0.018726     
Adjusted R Square 0.016297     
Standard Error 0.47795     
Observations 406     
      
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 1.761151 1.761151 7.709605 0.00574838 
Residual 404 92.28811 0.228436   
Total 405 94.04926    
 
 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.712411 0.036477 19.53058 2.69E-60 
Frequency (# of 
Times Raised) -0.0284 0.010228 -2.77662 0.005748 
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Figure 4 shows the output of a linear regression where X is Frequency (the 
number of times a given issue was raised) and Y is Resolution. In the above, Figure 
2 illustrated that F also has a very slight negative correlation with R—
approximately -0.16. Linear regression demonstrates that about 1.6% of the 
variance in R is explained by the F at which an issue is raised.  
As an initial matter, the p-value of .005 shows that our results were not a 
chance occurrence. That is, these results seemed to indicate that we could be 
confident, above a 95 percent chance, that the 1.3 percent lesser likelihood in 
Resolution (R) was the result of an increase in the Frequency (F) with which a 
given issue was raised. Furthermore, we can see from our coefficient of 
approximately -0.02 that for each time an issue is raised, the likelihood of 
Resolution goes down by 2 percent. After conducting a multiple regression (see 
Figure 6) we note that the single regression above in Figure 4 was absorbing some 
explanatory value from untested variables. For that reason, we must reduce our 
confidence interval to 90 percent. However, we can still be confident that the data 
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Figure 5: X=M (Motivation) 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT      
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.228817     
R Square 0.052357     
Adjusted R Square 0.050012     
Standard Error 0.469688     
Observations 406     
      
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 4.924162 4.924162 22.321 3.1888E-06 
Residual 404 89.1251 0.220607   




Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.761364 0.035404 21.50498 6.27E-69 
Motivation 
(Legality = 1; 


























Motivation (Legality = 1; Clarification = 0)
Motivation (Legality = 1; Clarification = 0) 
Line Fit  Plot
Resolved? (Yes = 1, No =  0)
Predicted Resolved? (Yes =
1, No =  0)
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Figure 5 shows the output of a linear regression where X is Motivation 
(legality v. clarification) and Y is Resolution. As noted above, Figure 2 showed a 
slight negative correlation of approximately -.2 between M and R. Linear 
regression shows that M accounts for approximately .05, or 5 percent, of the 
change in R. Moreover, our p-value of 3.19E-06 shows that this result is unlikely 
to have occurred by chance. 
Here, our p-value is substantially smaller than the 95 percent threshold 
discussed previously. For that reason, we can assert that this 5 percent observed 
negative change is statistically significant. Further, we can conclude due to our 
coefficient that a Legality motivation makes a Resolution approximately 22 
percent less likely to occur. This means that we can support our third hypothesis: 
that a legality challenge, rather than a motivation desiring clarification of a given 
issue, is less likely to result in a resolution among the parties. 
 
Figure 6: Multiple Regression (All Xs – L, F, M) 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT      
Regression 
Statistics      
Multiple R 0.25155     
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Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.81697 
0.04700581
3 17.38018 7.25E-51 
Level of 
Conflict - Types 
of Countries 
Involved 
(E.U./U.S. = 4; 
BRIC = 3; 
Regional = 2; 
LDC = 1; Other 
or N/A = 0) -0.00087 0.00338645 -0.25724 0.797127 
Frequency 
(# of Times 
Raised) -0.02024 
0.01175677
4 -1.72195 0.085848 
Motivation 
(Legality = 1; 
Clarification = 0) -0.20621 0.04751049 -4.3403 1.8E-05 
 
The multiple regression provides further clarity as to the overall model we 
have composed. As shown by the p-value associated with L, approximately 0.79, 
we must change our initial conclusion. We cannot support our hypothesis that a 
higher level of conflict results in a lesser amount of issue resolution at any 
reasonable confidence level. 
However, as discussed above, the multiple regression indicates that we can 
support our hypothesis that an issue being raised more often (frequency) results 
in a lower rate of resolution at a 90 percent, rather than 95 percent, confidence 
level. The associated p-value—approximately .08—has increased due to the 
multiple regression function, so our confidence level must decrease. Yet this is 
still a statistically significant value. We can therefore state, due to a coefficient of 
-0.02, that each increase in Frequency amounts to a 2 percent lesser likelihood of 
resolution. 
The reason for these changes is that the multiple regression looks into the 
explanatory value of the variables together. In doing so, it eliminates the bias inherent 
in single regressions that the single independent variable being tested is “soaking 
up” explanatory value from independent variables not being tested; here, those 
would be Level of Conflict and Motivation.  
Most substantially, the p-value of Motivation in the multiple regression is 
1.8E-5. Therefore, we can confirm within a 95 percent certainty our hypothesis 
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that a Legality inquiry, rather than a clarification inquiry, negatively affects the 
likelihood of resolution in a given instance. Our coefficient (approximately -0.2) 
indicates that a Legality claim results in a 20 percent lesser likelihood of Resolution 
of a given issue. 
D.  Explanations and Projections  
From these results, we can make several projections about the use of a 
transnational regulatory intermediary (TRI) as a new model of transnational 
regulatory governance. Our results appear to support the new model in a few key 
respects. 
We can infer from the first result that having prominent WTO members 
(such as the U.S. and the E.U.) involved may actually increase the possibility of 
resolving STCs. Our hypothesis that a greater level of conflict would contribute 
to a smaller likelihood of resolution was not supported by the data. We can posit 
that this result occurred because those members enjoy high regulatory capacity 
and therefore can bring useful information instrumental to regulatory deliberation 
to the TBT Committee. This may translate into a form of “communitization” of 
regulatory problems since what these developed country members offer 
eventually contributes to the resolution of potential disputes. At a micro level, 
social learning and capacity building may have happened between developed and 
developing country members in discussing particular STCs, which tends to 
generate resolution. Similarly, the level of conflict may also evidence a greater 
number of countries involved in a given issue. Therefore, in a strictly mathematical 
sense, the issue is being further communitized by greater group participation.  
As to the second result, as discussed above, we can support our initial 
hypothesis that more frequent discussions on an issue means a smaller likelihood 
of resolution. However, that likelihood was only reduced by 2 percent, a fairly 
negligible number even among the complexity of modeling human behavior. For 
that reason, we pose a new hypothesis related to frequency of interaction. Rather 
than merely reflecting potential inextricability of underlying regulatory challenges, 
the frequency of interaction may further the communitization of these regulatory 
issues. Frequency of communication intuitively results in more persistent and 
productive avenues for dialogue. In point of fact, in an anecdotal sense, issues 
were sometimes “cut off” from resolution in the meeting minutes by a perfunctory 
denial of dialogue. Therefore, openness to further discussion contributes to the 
TBT process in a far more complex way than representing a failure to reach a 
resolution. Perhaps, we may speculate that the frequency of interaction 
demonstrates the depth of regulatory dialogue and understanding among WTO 
members over particular STCs, even in the absence of a satisfactory result. 
Finally, the third result appears to be relatively clear. This clearly 
substantiates the effectiveness of the new model. Note that “legality” inquiries 
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tend to symbolize the old model based on formalism and enforcement. States that 
make legality inquiries are relying on an outdated language system for bringing 
issues before the newly communitized regulatory regime. Conversely, 
“clarification” inquiries appear to create a better discursive sphere than 
legalization inquiries. Requests for clarification are perhaps best characterized as 
more collaborative and less confrontational. For that reason, inquiries under the 
new model appear to be significantly more successful. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
Our conclusions illustrate the need for a new explanatory model. The 
conventional command-and-control theories related to regulatory requirements 
fall away in the face of IO regulatory bodies such as the WTO and the TBT 
Committee. Instead, a novel method must be developed that prioritizes and 
recognizes the discursive nature of international regulatory proceedings. Our 
findings that Motivation—Legality versus Clarification—makes a difference in the 
ultimate Resolution of an inquiry illustrates that the way regulatory problems are 
discussed, and thus communitized, affects the way parties ultimately reconcile. 
What remains is to continue pursuing, and improving, methods of analyzing this 
regulatory discourse.  
In particular, given the highly complex nature of regulatory discourse, more 
qualitative methods, such as interviewing actual participants of the TBT 
Committee meetings, are called for in an effort to contextualize the quantitative 
result demonstrated in this article and to better understand why legality inquiries 
nevertheless persist as a method of discourse for certain states. Considering that 
most STCs peer-reviewed under the TBT Committee are those “in the 
pipeline,”105 one might postulate that by electing a legality inquiry, as opposed to 
a clarification inquiry, the inquiring member might intend to signal a more serious 
message to the regulating member, as the former would hope for a possible 
modification or repeal of the STC in question. 
 
Annex: Coding Results and Statistical Analysis106 
                                                 
105  WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade, available at https://perma.cc/7LKQ-JSWV.  
106  Coding Results and Statistical Analysis (on file with authors and the Chicago Journal of International 
Law). 
